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N7KTP > NAVNET 13.05.05 02:56l 49 Lines 8646 Bytes #999 (0) @ ALLUS
BID : 37673_N7FSP
Read: GUEST
Subj: TORPEDO V. MURPHY'S LAW (PART 2)
Path: ON0AR<ON0AR<7M3TJZ<K7EK<N7FSP
Sent: 050512/1945z @:N7FSP.#SEA.#WWA.WA.USA.NOAM West Seattle, WA. on 145.010
THE TORPEDO VERSUS MURPHY'S LAW
by CAPT R.C. Gillette, USN (Ret)
In another warshot firing exercise, the target was a WWII underway surfaced diesel submarine. The firing vessel was a more modern Guppy II submarine. The weapon to be used was the MK 37 acoustic torpedo.
In readying the target submarine, certain emergency devices were installed to permit shutting down the engine of the target submarine if an emergency occurred during the event. A timer was installed that would shut down the engine after a preset peri
od of time. Additionally, an outrigger was installed on the target to support a line and ring arrangement which, when pulled, would shut down the engine. The devise was similar to catching the brass ring on a merry-go-round.
The exercise group consisted of a tug to tow the target to the firing area, a skeleton crew aboard the target submarine to start up the engine, and set the submarine on the firing course. Also, there was a helicopter which was to provide photos of th
e exercise and transfer the small team to and from the target submarine if needed.
The event commenced with the target stabilized on course and the tug taking off the submarine crew and pulling well clear of the target. The firing submarine then took position for a submerged firing run. All went well and the CO was in the progress
of making the final firing adjustments. At this point, Murphy's Law took charge as all auxiliary electrical power was lost. This type of casualty is one of the worst as all lighting, gyro
power, fire control and indicators went out. As a result, depth control was
temporarily lost. By the time power was restored, we were at 200 feet. Gradually the effect of the casualty was overcome and the firing submarine got back up to periscope depth and reacquired the target, which had been proceeding merrily toward Long Islan
d.
More delay resulted in getting the gyro up to speed and fire control system checked out. The firing run was restarted only to find our target had exited the firing area. An assessment of the situation revealed several options: (1) sink the target out
side the firing area, (2) wait until the timing device shut down the engine in about 15 minutes, or (3) attempt to board the target from the firing submarine by use of the brass ring and redirect the target into the firing area. Murphy had struck again.
Several events occurred which made the problem go critical. First, the timing device failed to operate, and second, it became very evident, after two attempts to catch the brass ring from the firing submarine, that the automatic helmsman of the target was
very erratic. Two hair-raising attempts to acquire the brass ring resulted in near disaster to both vessels' propellers.
After pulling clear of the target and reassessing the situation, it was apparent that the target, on its present course and speed, had plenty of fuel to go ashore on Long Island arid possibly interrupt a garden party in the Hamptons. By now, the tug
was too far away to help. The only other asset was the photo helicopter. When the helicopter pilot was queried as to whether he had the rescue hoist equipment aboard, he replied in the affirmative, but hastily added that he did not have anybody on board q
ualified to be lowered to snare the brass ring on board the target. While mulling over this bit of info, our intrepid leader of the skeleton target SS crew, now on the tug, volunteered that he thought he could handle the job. With no more ado, the helicop
ter was dispatched to the tug, picked up the volunteer crewman, returned to the target and lowered away. This was a very dicey affair as the mall was close aboard the submarine, like a man on the flying trapeze. However, after two near misses, he caught t
he brass ring and shut down the target. With the engine stopped, the tug, with the
rest of the crew, was able to re-board and redirect it into the firing area.
Time was now of the essence as it was essential to get the sinking completed before dark, which was fast approaching. The prospect of escorting the target through the night, manned or unmanned, was intimidating, to say the least. As soon as the tug c
leared the area, the firing run was commenced and the MK37 acoustic torpedo was launched. All hands breathed a sigh of relief when the acoustic torpedo struck the target in the vicinity of the after engine room and target submarine gradually disappeared b
elow along with Murphy, as the sun set and darkness closed in.
The following describes some additional torpedo warshot firing experiences.
As a Flotilla Commander in the 60s, I had a reaction about torpedoes similar to that of Admiral Farragut when a Russian trawler swept up a torpedo in his net off the coast of New London and had it on deck.
Evidently, to the trawler's crew and CO, the bronze warhead with all its
markings had all the earmarks of a live warhead. Consequently, panic on board the trawler ensued. The CO of the trawler voiced his concern in no uncertain terms in the middle of the night over all emergency radio circuits to all who would listen.
The trawler was located well off the Atlantic coast. Fortunately or, as it turned out, unfortunately for me, I had two submarines and a tug operating in the vicinity conducting a weekly training exercise. The submarines would fire exercise torpedoes
under the tug as a target and the tug would then recover the torpedoes. Subsequent to intercepting the emergency messages from the trawler, I received a "yours for action" down from Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, through the submarine command chain w
ith orders to_ repossess the torpedo from the trawler. Consequently, the tug was ordered to rendezvous with the trawler and to have the leading torpedoman examine the torpedo and inform me of the type and of any hazard involved in recovering the weapon. T
he information was to be passed encoded to the tug to avoid revealing anything about the weapon to the Russians.
The trawler was a modern, beautiful ship about 200 feet long with a crew of about 90. Included in the crew were a number of women and a group of electronic and communication personnel, plus a Commissar who was to cause us some indigestion. It was equ
ipped with an elaborate suite of electronics and communications gear. The gear was monitoring a wide spectrum of circuits.The Torpedoman reported back through the submarine that the torpedo was an obsolete MK-XVI hydrogen peroxide, expendable torpedo whos
e warhead was loaded with plaster of Paris. On the basis of this information, a message was sent off to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, indicating that the torpedo was obsolete, inert, and, if the Russians copied any of its parts, their torpedo pr
ogram would be set back at least 10 years and recommended we "deep six" it.
The response from CINCLANTFLT was immediate to the effect that the Navy never gave up its weapons under any circumstances and that the torpedo should be repossessed forthwith. These orders posed quite a problem as the potential boarding party had to
be derived from the crews of the tug and the two submarines versus the 80-90 man crew of the trawler. The odds didn't appear to be very promising in the event of any resistance on the part of the trawler.In reviewing the problem, it was apparent that the
trawler skipper and crew were still on the verge of panic over the situation. Consequently, a plan was developed to capitalize on their fear by telling the skipper we shared his concern. He was told again that the torpedo was very unstable, might be very
dangerous, could detonate at any minute, and should not be moved. We would helo an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team of experts to examine the torpedo and supervise the safe disposal or transfer it to the tug. The trawler and tug were directed to rendezvou
s at first light at a designated point on the 100 fathom curve within range of a helicopter coming from Quonset Point, Rhode Island. The
plan was to transfer the torpedo to the tug by helo, if feasible; if not, "deep six" it beyond the 100 fathom curve.
Prior to the arrival of the helo at the rendezvous point, the CO of the trawler informed us that he had received instructions from the mothership, which was evidently beyond the horizon. The CO referred to the "Big Chief" located on the mothership. "
Big Chief" had told the CO to bring the weapon to the mothership. We immediately warned the CO that his ship was in a very hazardous situation and he would be well advised to await the arrival of the torpedo and disposal experts before moving the weapon
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