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N7KTP  > NAVNET   21.10.05 19:19l 169 Lines 10542 Bytes #999 (0) @ USA
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Subj: BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR
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Sent: 051021/1151z @:N7FSP.#SEA.#WWA.WA.USA.NOAM West Seattle, WA. on 145.010

The following article was taken from the Fall Quarter 2005 issue of the 
UNDERSEA QUARTERLY, THE NEWSLETTER OF THE NAVAL UNDERSEA MUSEUM FOUNDATION

TRAFALGAR

By Ralph Enos

     On October 21st this year, Great Britain's Royal Navy will 
celebrate the 200th anniversary of Lord Nelson's great victory over the 
French and Spanish fleets at Cape Trafalgar. Indeed, the Royal Navy 
celebrates Trafalgar night every year, but this year the bicentennial 
of the date will bring fresh insights into the celebration as the world 
asks, "What is it about this naval action that so commends it to the 
Royal Navy?"
     The answer in brief is that the Trafalgar campaign and the battle of the same name 
eliminated Napoleon's menace to the British Isles, and settled the British navy's 
supremacy at sea for the next hundred years. So it was not just the Royal Navy that 
should recognize the importance of the victory, but all of Great Britain. With naval supremacy, the British were able to control the seas throughout the world, and in the latter half of the nineteenth century, behind this shield were able to carve out the
 greatest 
overseas empire yet seen.
     The U.S. Navy benefited from this in that it was the successor 
power to the British and in the second World War surpassed our allies, 
the British, in naval power together with inheriting from its British 
cousins responsibility for keeping the world's oceans free.
     But it had not been easy at Trafalgar, especially the campaign 
that preceded the battle. Nelson kept watch over France's Toulon-based 
fleet for two years after the peace of Amiens broke down in 1803. His 
orders were to prevent that fleet from joining France's English Channel 
fleet based at Brest, which would give Napoleon temporary numerical 
superiority over the British home fleet, and enable him to move his 
Grande Armee to a landing in England. Since Britain had declared war on 
him in May 1803, he had been drilling 150,000 troops for the invasion 
and had gathered 2400 small craft to carry them. He didn't care if the 
fleet were subsequently destroyed; he needed temporary numerical 
advantage in ships of the line to move his army from its base at 
Boulogne in the Pas de Calais the few short miles to the Dover beaches. 
Once landed he, and the British, expected him to make short work of the 
British home guard. That was why England put its faith in the "wooden 
walls" of its navy to protect itself from invasion,     Napoleon had 
instructed his fleets based at Brest, Rochefort, L'Orient, and Toulon, 
and after Spain joined him as an ally in late 1804, Spanish vessels at 
La Corunna, Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena, to attempt to elude the 
blockading British ships and, once free, to head for a rendezvous at 
the West Indian island of Martinique. The French and Spanish had about 
the same number of ships of the line (great lumbering battleships) as 
the British. He hoped the blockading British ships would scatter on 
"wild goose chases" seeking his ships. Once enough ships had gathered, 
they were to head for the Channel where they would combine with the 
Brest squadron and fall on the English Channel fleet, hopefully 
achieving numerical superiority to fight the channel fleet long enough 
for Napoleon's army to cross. The British blockading squadrons had 
orders for the event that the blockaded ships were to elude them, they 
were to fall back on the English Channel rather than chase the departed 
ships across the seas. Thus the British had a foolproof strategy in 
place. Rather than chase the elusive French/ Spanish ships around the 
globe, they would fall back on the Home Fleet, thus assuring that the 
essential mission of protecting the homeland was provided for. 
     On March 30, 1805, Admiral Pierre Villeneuve, commanding the 
Toulon squadron, completely eluded Nelson using a gale as cover and 
headed for the West Indies with 11 ships of the line. Along the way he 
picked up seven more from the Spanish port of Cadiz. Nelson chose to 
chase him across the Atlantic rather than obey his orders to fall back 
on the Channel. When Villeneuve learned that Nelson was in the vicinity 
looking for him, he was unnerved; he resolved to sail for home 
immediately, rather than wait for more ships to gather (he had been 
joined by two ships of the Rochefort squadron); so, late in June, he 
made for home.
     Nelson was in hot pursuit, but not fast enough. Nelson sent a fast 
brig to England to warn them of Villeneuve's intentions. Nelson, who 
should have sailed to join the channel fleet, opted instead to sail to 
Gibraltar. The Admiralty sent a squadron to intercept Villeneuve. Which 
they did, fighting an inconclusive engagement in the fog off Cape 
Finisterre, which cost the French two Spanish battleships, but letting 
them get away to Ferrol. In the meantime, Nelson finally sailed to join 
Cornwallis's covering fleet at Brest. Villeneuve picked up more 
reinforcements and, following Napoleon's orders, should have sailed for 
Brest. Instead, knowing that the British were on to his whereabouts, he 
chose to sail instead for Cadiz. This action essentially ended 
Napoleon's threat to invade England; immediately upon learning that 
Villeneuve had sailed for Cadiz on August 22nd, he issued orders that 
set the Grande Armee marching for Austria, a campaign that ended with 
the Battle of Austerlitz early in December.
     But Villeneuve's fleet remained a threat, watched over now by 
Nelson and Collingwood. In the fall, Napoleon needed a fleet in the 
Mediterranean, so he ordered Villeneuve to depart for that sea. It was 
this move that Nelson intercepted off the Spanish Cape Trafalgar.
     Nelson had brought additional ships with him out of England, where 
he had been ordered after Villeneuve was definitely in Cadiz. The 
Admiralty had given him tactical command and he anticipated the Franco-
Spanish breakout attempt. He provided a tactical plan for his captains 
that would work despite the fog of battle and the difficulties in 
reading signals during combat. He intended to maintain the weather gage 
and to dispatch Collingwood with 11 sail to attack the enemy rear while 
he cut off the van of their formation. He would see to it that the van 
could not turn into the wind to succor the rear.
     Villeneuve was under no illusions about the ardor of the British 
fleet and he viewed a sortie as roughly suicidal. He put to sea to 
carry out Napoleon's orders when it appeared that Napoleon had sent an 
admiral to replace him, which he considered a blot on his honor. The 
Franco-Spanish fleet emerged from Cadiz on October 19th and tried to 
head south to round Gibraltar. It turns out that Villeneuve had 33 
ships and Nelson only 27, having let six go to revictual at Gibraltar. 
Nelson was at sea already and kept out of sight to the west, but 
Nelson's frigates were in touch with the enemy and instantly made him 
aware of their movements. Sunday, October 20th was blustery and foul, 
but Monday, October 21st dawned clear. Villeneuve, attempting to keep 
Cadiz on his lee, ordered his fleet to turn north. But by noon, Nelson 
let loose the attack with his famous signal: "England expects that 
every man will do his duty." Thus, Nelson, leading in Victory, bore 
down with 12 sail on the van of the formation seeking a place to break 
through the enemy's line. He found it and took Villeneuve's flagship 
Bucentaure under heavy fire. Meanwhile, Collingwood engaged the 15 
ships of the enemy rear very effectively. Nelson's attack on the van 
assured that none of the some 12 ships ahead of Bucentaure were able to 
turn around and come to the aid of the beleaguered center and rear. In 
all the combined French and Spanish fleet lost 20 vessels that day. 
     Alas, when Nelson's flagship engaged the French flagship 
Bucentaure and the adjacent battleship Redoubtable, a sharpshooter on 
the latter put a ball into Admiral Nelson's spine, fatally injuring 
him. So the great English triumph was tinged with melancholy. Its great 
victory where sea power was enthroned in Great Britain for more than a 
century, was tainted: Lord Horatio Nelson, Viscount Nile, the architect 
of so much of that sea power, was dead.
     And the nation mourned him and honored him in its great capital, 
where a great public square fronting the Admiralty was named
Trafalgar Square and a great monument in that square, with a 170' tall 
column topped by a statue of the admiral, became the Nelson monument.
     Conscious of the importance of Trafalgar in British history the 
Royal Navy hosted an International Fleet Review that took place on June 
28, 2005 and will celebrate Trafalgar Night with dinners, parades, 
fireworks, and a grand memorial service in St. Paul's Cathedral on 
Sunday, October 23rd. The Trafalgar campaign, which historians point 
out frustrated Napoleon by denying him local naval superiority, will be 
analyzed separately from Nelson's great victory. Here, Admiral William 
Cornwallis is the hero (who kept the French squadron at Brest 
immobilized such that Villeneuve despaired of breaking the blockade and 
opted instead to repair to Cadiz) where his fleet was soon blockaded by 
Nelson.
     Nelson is undoubtedly the hero of the battle of Trafalgar, and he 
is justly honored for his plan of victory and the way in which he 
entrusted its execution to his captains, his "Band of Brothers."' 
Simply put, the British sailors and marines fought their admirals' 
battles better than their enemies because they believed in what they 
were doing, it was important to their nation. This is why Nelson's 
signal: "England expects every man to do his duty" resonates to this 
day. If every man on board does his duty surely they cannot fail! 
Admiral Nelson was truly beloved by his men. And rightly so.
     It was this elan that the British mariner affected, and which the 
British nation came to rely in the long years of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Some may call this British command of the 
sea arrogant, but it was, in their view, well-earned. In battle fierce 
and unrelenting for twenty years, the Royal Navy provided the "wooden 
walls" to keep its foes at bay. Up to Trafalgar, it all seemed so 
precarious; then with Nelson's victory, the threat from the sea seemed 
finally removed and the nation could relax. Ships around the globe, 
they would fall back on the Home Fleet, thus assuring that the 
essential mission of protecting the homeland was provided for.













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